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Faith and Fortune in the Post-Colonial 
Classroom
Abstract The place of spirituality, religion, faith and cynicism in management edu-
cation has received increasing attention in the past decade. From the point of view of 
teaching focused on critical engagement with practice, they are sometimes viewed as 
obstacles to practice. In this article we use resources from post-colonial thought and global 
critical race theory to suggest the opposite—that faith and cynicism can be understood as 
forms of critique issuing from the student perspective and that we might learn from these 
critiques as a way to reconfi gure persistent dilemmas in the critique of the Enlightenment 
that trouble critical management approaches. We discuss a case study of the resistance to 
gigantic dam projects in India to illustrate both the possibilities of these critiques through 
what we call ‘faith’ and ‘fortune’, and the extent of the struggle that still remains to 
make such critiques effective. We then reconsider the dialectic of what Denise Ferreira da 
Silva calls ‘affectability and self-determination’ and the potential of liberation theology 
to offer a way to develop a ‘preferential option’ for the affectable subject. Drawing on 
the work of political philosopher and historian Jacques Rancière we conclude on a note 
of optimism about the creative subjectifi cation of affectability. Key Words: critical race 
theory; critique; Enlightenment; pedagogy; postcolonial
Introduction
At a recent conference on empiricism at a college of the University of London, 
one of whose objectives was to explore the nature of the ‘evidence’ that is increas-
ingly required of scholarly research as an input into policy, practice and curriculum 
development, one contributor questioned how social scientists could continue to 
teach ‘Muslim students’ (sic) through a curriculum based on science and history, 
when some such students found evidence of truth and objectivity instead in faith.1 
Management studies as a social science with its own contemporary concerns with 
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knowledge, evidence and practice might ask itself the same question, as much 
in the USA, Singapore, or Accra, as London or Cairo. The question also curi-
ously unites both orthodox and heterodox scholars, specifi cally in their work 
as teachers. Faith and fortune in the classroom today challenge the scholar as 
teacher, but perhaps not in the way that the question might suggest: that is, not 
because faith or fortune undermine approaches to science or history based on 
reason and critique, but rather because they are implicitly critical of what we will 
here call here the production of fate.
In this article we explore a possible pedagogical strategy for what we will call 
the post-colonial classroom. We fi rst question the juxtaposition of the rational 
social sciences and the irrational student; second, we question the assumption 
that the student responds to a rationally organized world irrationally; and third, 
we question the implication that the answer to this contradiction can be worked 
out outside of classroom engagement—even in articles such as this one. We then 
ask what strategic resources we might fi nd in and through our students, and how 
available critiques of the Enlightenment (and indeed ‘enlightenment’), from the 
critique of capital, to the critique of the production of knowledge itself, to the cri-
tique of universality and the production of man, might allow us to confront at 
least some of the contemporary contradictions in which we are caught up.
Faith, Fortune and Fate
By faith we mean religious faith, and by fortune we mean non-religious faith, such 
as an investment in luck or conspiracy theories—spiritual or non-spiritual attri-
butions of causality and consequence.2 By the production of fate we mean both 
the subjection of more and more of life to market logics, and also the way that 
science and history pursue these logics in a battle of rationality versus any sense 
of preordained fate. In other words, the present state of affairs is presented not 
as capricious or serendipitous, benign or corrupt but as a consequence of the 
working out of natural, rational principles. Any critique of the state of affairs 
must therefore always seem exceptional both to those market logics and to that 
rationality as well—as Margaret Thatcher was fond of arguing, ‘There is no 
alternative’. It is against the uncertainties and unpredictabilities of the market, 
and the sense in which rationality seems to feed this market, that ‘irrational’ 
faith and fortune are deployed in the classroom, and in the life of students. In 
effect, students may ironically be losing their faith in rationality. The failure of 
numerous rational and distinctly ‘modern’ projects, from the welfare state in the 
USA; to state socialism in China; to development programmes in Africa; to Enron 
and fi nancial engineering; to the credit crunch and periodic crises of confi dence 
in the fi nancial markets, has only reinforced this defensive deployment of faith 
and fortune, the post-colonial classroom, a classroom built on the ruins of the 
Chinese walls battered down by globalization.
For more orthodox scholars who attempt to use ‘normal’ science, or indeed nor-
mative history, to account for human behaviour (including that human behaviour 
which does not conform to the precepts of rationality), the encounter with faith, 
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or other forms of apprehending the world, is a challenge to scholarship for which 
more of the same sort of science is the answer and research journals refl ect 
this.3 But the story in teaching is different. Here the scholar is in the position of 
asking the student to accept some form of ‘science’ as the best way to understand 
something that does not inhabit science. If the student does not accept science, 
and in some instances history, as the framework for knowledge, the teacher will 
fi nd it diffi cult either to transfer the form of knowledge in which they are most 
profi cient, or to set up debates about such knowledge (such as those popular set-
pieces between critical realism and relativism typifi ed by Fleetwood, 2005).
But the challenge appears no less formidable for heterodox scholars. Trained 
to critique the limits of the European Enlightenment, and to identify the produc-
tive and regulatory powers of science and history, these scholars certainly have 
much to point to in the contemporary world that opens up to this critique, from 
the ‘rationalities’ of war to the ‘progress’ of bio-prospecting. But in the class-
room, the approach that begins with the tenets of the Enlightenment that 
underpin orthodox or mainstream approaches, and then makes a critique of 
the gap between the signifi er and signifi ed, rhetoric and reality, falters. Before 
teachers can share with students doubts about the just or appropriate application 
of science or history, or explore the way ‘humanity’ does not so much produce 
the Enlightenment as the Enlightenment produces ‘humanity’, such students 
would have to share such a discomfort. If on the other hand, some students 
possess a parallel certainty about the origins of the ‘human’, as strong as the 
most convinced humanist, the critique would seem to risk falling on deaf ears, 
or being misinterpreted. Perhaps a critique of science would suit someone with 
an alternative account. But the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ that critical pedagogy 
might offer such students would hardly seem comforting to these parallel 
certainties.
But although this question of how to teach based on the heritage of the 
Enlightenment may unite orthodox and heterodox scholars at the level of its 
initial contradiction, we would argue that scholars who do base their research 
and teaching on a critique of the Enlightenment are better placed to confront 
this contradiction than those who see it as an unfi nished project, and are better 
able to try to work through its implications. This is so for three reasons that we 
shall elaborate in the next section. But fi rst we should say that no doubt all good 
scholars, and teachers, are aware of the limits to and problems with constructions 
of science and history. Without rehearsing epistemological debates here, we mean 
to suggest a practical distinction in teaching between process and topic—does 
the teacher encourage an overall approach where every instance of science 
or account of history is subjected to questioning at the level of language and 
ideology, regardless of where it occurs within a programme? Or are such issues 
resolved only within the sanitizing cordon of a specifi c unit of address, such as 
a lecture on methods or ethics or even ‘critical approaches’? If the latter is the 
case, critique inevitably courts marginalization, critical skills are less likely to be 
nurtured over time, and the critical position is one of risk and vulnerability, one 
far less robust and practically able to confront the contradictions at hand. So 
how do we proceed?
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Questioning Enlightenment
The fi rst way that teachers who work from a critique of the Enlightenment might 
seek to address this contradiction is, as we promised, by returning to the pre-
mise of the question raised at the beginning of this article. Such a return to a 
founding premise is of course in keeping with a critique that must always turn 
on itself, as indeed we will need to acknowledge the continuing production of 
reason, and reasonableness, in our own argument. The querulous sociologist at 
the conference contrasted her position as someone interested in reason and its 
limits, with the ‘Muslim students’ who fi nd answers in faith. But is this a sus-
tainable characterization of social science and social inquiry? Is the history of 
their development one marked solely by reason, and the exploration of reason? 
Is it one where science and history are called upon as tools to open up society to 
reason? The answer must certainly be both yes and no. How many times have the 
social sciences been called upon in the name of reason, only to be used to mask 
prejudice, ideology, and interest? One recalls the notorious ‘science’ of the races 
in the 19th century, the birth of anthropology and sociology amid colonialism 
and fears of anarchism, Cold War political science, or the compromises made by 
area studies or experts of social policy on welfare, drugs, or crime. The list of 
superb studies of the unreason of the social sciences is long here, from political 
critiques such as Chomsky et al.’s (1998) The Cold War and the University to Cooke 
et al.’s (2006) ‘The Cold War and Management’, and such a list cautions us about 
taking up the side of ‘those who are not deceived’, to invoke Jacques Lacan. This 
is the fi rst reason a critique of Enlightenment thinking is important, because it 
begins from the premise that we are always already caught in its logic, and subject 
to its problematic style of thinking.
This does not mean being inward-looking or self-defeating. There is a second 
way in which a hermeneutics of suspicion can confront this seeming contradiction 
in teaching today. Just as rationality itself is not as pervasive, or as rational, in the 
social sciences as (some versions of) these sciences would have us believe, neither is 
it as pervasive in the daily lives of our students as we might imagine. It is not 
so much that students reject the rational in favour of faith or fortune in their 
daily lives, as their daily lives fail to prove rational. From the fortune-telling of 
the fi nancial markets; to the arbitrary power of managers and failing CEOs who 
get massive golden handshakes; to the persistence of racism, sexism, and homo-
phobia in organizations and society; to the cynical accumulation and deployment 
of affect in consumption; to arbitrary state violence, the phenomenological 
universe of students (and not students alone) hardly conforms to the steady 
spread of science or the onward march of history—reality and fantasy rub 
shoulders on equal terms. Here is where the fi rst critique of the Enlightenment 
becomes important. The critique of capital (largely emergent from Marx) saw 
the production of rationality and the production of fate as two sides of the same 
coin. For every step in pursuit of science or in the organization of history, a step 
in the development of capitalism meant submitting more and more of life, and 
the globe, to the fate of markets, wage-labour, and the drive for accumulation, 
introducing more and more for science and history to do. The submission of 
all life to fate, which Karl Polyani (2001) classically documented, is understood 
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today by critics of capitalism such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as the real 
subsumption of life under capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004). By this they 
mean that the forms themselves in which life reproduces itself are determined by 
the needs of markets in capital and labour (for instance, families, schools, even 
religion). This in turn means that these forms are abstracted as capitalist work in a 
moment of rationality in order to be inserted into direct production in the market 
(from fast food, to child care, to gyms, to for-profi t universities, all contain forms 
of direct work once hidden beneath the male worker or in other instances the 
subsistence farmer).4 This coming into history of the realm of social reproduction 
replaces the alleged natural and enchanted world of the home, the community, 
the child, with the roulette wheel of the market, a disenchantment that is at the 
same time re-enchanted in the charms of capitalist faith and fortune.
It seems hardly surprising then that faced with this atmosphere of fate, students 
should turn to faith, since in this reading rationality and history are not so much 
the answers to fate as the handmaidens. This fi rst critique of the Enlightenment 
allows the teacher trained in this tradition to question today’s post-ideological 
consensus about free markets as ‘the one best way’. At the very least this is 
useful to understanding the phenomenological universe of the students in the 
classroom. As Georg Lukács (1972) put it
In every aspect of daily life in which the individual worker imagines himself to be the 
subject of his own life he fi nds this to be an illusion that is destroyed by the immediacy 
of his existence . . . He is therefore forced into becoming the object of the process by 
which he is turned into a commodity and reduced to a mere quantity.
Such an understanding of the implicit if not explicit predicament of the students 
could of course lead, as unfortunately it sometimes has in the tradition of this 
fi rst critique of the Enlightenment, to a teaching strategy in which it is simply a 
matter of pulling the veil from the eyes of these students, of showing them that 
the markets in which they believe as business students are the source of the fate 
that buffets them in daily life.
But of course this strategy is in complete contradiction to the point of the 
critique, as it calls for more (better) science and more history without starting with 
the practical daily circumstances of the production and reception of this 
rationality. As Slavoj Žižek (2007) has reminded us, it is not so much that students 
think the commodity is magical. Almost any student who is confronted with the 
accusation that they are fetishizing a mobile phone or a pair of sneakers will 
admit that it is only an object and that there is something wrong with needing to 
obtain such objects to build a subjectivity. They are not in this sense unrefl exive. 
The problem is the opposite. Although students can understand that such a fetish 
of the commodity is wrong, they cannot act on this understanding. They must 
act as if, in their daily lives, such commodities do have magical powers. This is 
why the ‘false consciousness’ approach to teaching, which in the end is only a 
version of positivism, is wide of the mark. It is also why one has to draw on other 
parts of this fi rst critique of the Enlightenment, and yet newer critiques of the 
Enlightenment, to come up with a more satisfactory way of confronting the con-
tradictions of the classroom.
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One of the more important ways to avoid this false consciousness position, 
and with it the faith in a neutrality of science and history in the mind, a faith 
the critique of capital begins, after all, by attacking, is to be found again in 
Georg Lukács (1972). In Lukács we fi nd the notion of the standpoint, a partial 
view of science and history that is nonetheless neither arbitrary nor stationary. 
For Lukács, although everyone might be subjected to this production of reason 
trying to keep pace with the production of fate, where one stands in relation to 
these processes can be crucial. In particular, if one is fully submitted to this fate, 
because for instance one must fi nd a job in order not to starve, or one faces un-
predictable violence in the home or from the police, then the answers of science 
and history will necessarily appear inadequate to the scale of the danger. Indeed 
pulled far enough into the world of fate, becoming as Jacques Rancière (2004) 
would say, abject, offers an entirely special standpoint. From here, a kind of 
abolition becomes necessary. Because what one is appears to be nothing but 
this fate, one must call for the abolition of fate, which is also the abolition of 
oneself. Needless to say this can take more than one form. But for Lukács the 
collectivity of this standpoint would lead to a class politics calling for the abol-
ition of the class rather than any individual or set of individuals, ruling out for 
instance either suicide bombers or F-1 bombers, where no solidarity based on 
full submission to fate can be recognized from a class perspective. These more 
familiar contemporary forms of violence seek proof of their own place in a fateful 
world, not the end of their place through the end of this kind of fate. Like the 
great meditations on the abolition of slavery from Frederick Douglas to Angela 
Davis, the end in Lukács is not an annihilation of self or other, but an end to 
the annihilating present.
To begin then with a fractured world but one that cannot remain content with 
this partial view because, for some, moving to a total view is a matter of life and 
death, may seem a dramatic element to introduce into a business school class. 
Indeed it is precisely because business students fi nd themselves wavering between 
fate on the one hand and science and history on the other, that faith rarely fi nds 
its action. In this regard the classroom is not so much confronted then with a con-
tradiction, as it is a workshop for the production of contradiction. This is because 
the student comes to class, as Zˇizˇek suggests, knowing better, but ironically and 
wittingly joining with the teacher in reproducing this rationality in the teeth 
of fate. This would seem to indicate that the classroom is today not so much a 
place full of a faith that makes the scientists of man uncomfortable, as it is full 
of cynicism.5 Yet this classroom, if we are to trace this line from Lukács to Davis, 
must also contain what Foucault called ‘subjugated knowledges’. And these may 
be a source of strategy in the face of these contradictions.
To recap our argument then, the original question of the sociologist in the con-
ference has now been deconstructed in three ways: we have questioned the 
juxtaposition of the rational social sciences to the irrational student, we have 
questioned the assumption that the student responds to a rationally organized 
world irrationally, and we have questioned the implicit suggestion that the answer 
to this contradiction is to be worked out by teachers at conferences, using yet 
more of their analytic skills. We now need to explore what strategic resources we 
might fi nd in our students, and how the critiques of the Enlightenment we 
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have mentioned might allow us to confront the contradictions in which we are 
inevitably caught up.
Strategies for the Post-Colonial Classroom
One way to do this would be to confront the cynicism of the moment together, 
teacher and students. If indeed despite their experience of capitalism as a fate 
beyond reason, students pay fees to learn the reason of management, accounting, 
and marketing, then it does suggest either that these students want to believe, 
despite the evidence to the contrary, in the rationality of their world, or that 
they feel forced to act as if they could master this ubiquitous fate. And perhaps 
these are not so different. It would be more comfortable if the commodity fetish 
were a seamless rather than a contradictory experience. Desire for the commodity 
becomes a desire to be commodifi ed, as commodifi cation of the self bestows an 
identity that grants a certain social leverage. Indeed, remaining without com-
modifi cation can be problematic in terms of recognition—both in terms of 
how social systems identify and subjectify individuals and how social individuals 
might generate possibilities for resistance. Hence the continued success of the 
MBA. Pressing on this point, and trying really to believe with the students in the 
power of capitalism might be a way to pressure the contradiction between what 
capitalism promises to its rational children and what it can deliver. But that 
strategy has been explored elsewhere (Harney and Oswick, 2006).6 Case and 
Selvester (2000) also record this false promise in an international management 
curriculum. Instead let us again take seriously the standpoint of students but this 
time not in the direction of their practice of self-commodifi cation—their strug-
gle to embody the rationality of capitalism and its promises—rather let us take 
seriously their practice of critique.
By practice of critique we mean that application of faith, or cynicism, or 
mysticism, or rebellion deployed against the production of fate, and often with the 
hollow practice of learning the rational techniques of management, marketing, 
and accounting. Rather than squeezing that practice to make it yield its con-
tradictions, let us ask what this practice of critique might force open. What these 
different critiques in the face of the production of fate share is a sense that 
neither history nor science holds the answers, and even in some cases that they 
contribute to the proliferation of fate. In other words this critique charges them 
with being insuffi cient to the moment, if not complicit, and it seeks in their 
stead some larger, better, more durable way of coping with the production of 
fate. Let us call this, after Frederic Jameson, an impulse toward totality, a way of 
putting together a habitable understanding of what confronts them as students 
of business, and as subjects of capitalism. Jameson (1992) has suggested that the 
preference for conspiracy theories in both science fi ction and in politics is a 
misplaced impulse toward totality, a sense among people that there must be other 
connections they cannot see that explain the world.
This sense that there must be other invisible or obscured connections comes 
from both a negative and positive set of experiences and practices, and thus takes 
into account the spectrum of critiques coming from students, from cynicism to 
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faith. On the one hand, to know that a pair of sneakers is just a pair of sneakers, 
but to continue to act otherwise, might imply that there is some element of com-
punction, just out of view, forcing this contrary behaviour. This produces the 
frequent and misplaced psychologization of the commodity fetish as motivated by 
some inner compunction working against our outer sense of self. On the other 
hand, the magic of socialized labour and the supernatural collective abilities 
wrought by capitalism, could suggest to students that behind these mundane 
practices of rationality are the hands of some otherworldly power. Accordingly, 
as Slavoj Zˇizˇek has remarked, capitalism is subjectively materialist, but objectively 
idealist—it engenders belief. Markets cannot operate without some form of 
belief—and the more deterritorialized they are, like fi nancial markets, the more 
ideational, magical, or even theological they become.
But here we reach a problem—how can this strategy be kept from reducing 
itself to just a moral argument? How do we avoid responding to the objectively 
idealist quality of capital with another idealism—that of morality, or, as it is called 
in the practical world of business, ethics.7 This might work for a portion of those 
students who seek totality in faith, but what of those who seek it in fortune, in 
cynicism, in mysticism, or in rebellions that need strategy? Even for students who 
posit faith as the totality that history and science cannot provide in the face of 
the production of fate, it is clear that this strategy has not reduced either their 
rough treatment at the hands of this fate, or their contradictory position as those 
who practise the rationalities of business without believing in them. This is not a 
problem for Jameson because his totality is immediately a materialist one. Indeed 
for him there is an admittedly unfashionable preference for the economic, 
though he does not mean this in what he would call the bourgeois sense that 
permits him to translate the implicit morality tales of conspiracy theories into 
the problematics of class struggle. He is able to do this because of an expansive 
sense of the cultural, subsumed as a form of life, within contemporary capitalism, 
suggesting therefore it is capital, not Jameson, urging the economic upon us.
But in our circumstances, if we want to encompass the range of the practices 
of critique among our students, we will need some help from what at fi rst might 
seem like the wrong place to look. Because here we are going to take another 
post-colonial direction, through the ideas of Latin American, African, and Asian 
liberation theologians.
Exploring Affectability
But fi rst we must make a small detour through a brilliant new book by a Brazilian 
sociologist, Denise Ferreira da Silva, called Toward a Global Idea of Race (2007). 
In this monumental critique of western philosophy and social science, and its 
defective insistence on the self-determination of individual consciousness, and 
latterly, European individual consciousness, we have a way to take seriously the 
subjugated knowledges of faith and scepticism in our students. Exploring her 
argument helps us to see a long history of containment of which the management 
sciences are only the most recent instance. What da Silva is concerned with is 
what she calls affectable things, that is everything outside of consciousness that 
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seems to be infl uenced by other things, but especially by bodies and other beings. 
She traces a history of the development of western thought that diminishes affect-
ability, and all people who can be said to be affectable. In this history of thought 
affectability stands in contrast to self-determination, and becomes vulnerable to 
rule and domination. Her arguments here are complex, but she tracks the way 
European thinkers fi rst produce reason, and then fear it. They fear it will displace 
the individual mind as that which orders and explains the world. They fear, in 
other words, that self-determination will pass from them to it. What she does not 
explore is the phenomenology of this fear. The intellectual history she charts is 
also however the history of the rise of capitalism, and of the general intellectual 
equivalent Marx saw animating the commodity fetish. These Enlightenment 
thinkers both wanted this form of reason, against the past, and feared it, against 
the future. What they produce as a result is a kind of self-determination that is 
aggressive, even violent, in its identifi cation of any body and any thing that seems 
vulnerable to the forces of external reason, any body that gives itself over to a 
kind of affective sociality. Of course the greatest external animator of the body, 
as Marx often rendered it, was to be capital, which would take possession of the 
worker. But of course, the Enlightenment tradition tended to look to emerging 
commerce, trade and money as progressive even as they feared its independent 
forces. Thus until Marx (and even he is not entirely free of it), it was, and would 
remain, other forms of possession, other forms of sociality, of collective affect 
that would form the enemy’s list of the Enlightenment, a list populated with 
the bodies of women, queers, communists, and colonials, to name the most de-
pressingly familiar.
Through what Denise Ferreira da Silva calls ‘globality’, in the hands of 
Enlightenment thinkers and their patrons and followers, this kind of vigilant self-
determination comes to order all humans, using the tools of science and history, 
according to their degree of self-determination and resistance to affectability. 
Because this ordering is done in the name of a universal humanism (even after 
the death of the subject), each call to include more humans in the category of self-
determination, only reinforces the insidious fact of the two categories again. These 
comments can only be a gloss on a rewarding work but it is enough to allow us 
to place against this deployment of history and science another project that seeks to 
reach universality through the bodies of others not against them.
To know that you are not self-determined because you are possessed by cap-
italism and its rationality is a strange thing. So often the commodity fetish to 
which we have already referred imagines the commodity as we have ourselves 
rendered it here, as a pair of sneakers, as a dance of sneakers that becomes 
the primary set of social relations in society. But the production of the human 
about which da Silva writes is not fi nally overtaken by history and science, that 
is to say affected by rationality unto the death of the subject, so much as it is 
subsumed by capital, affected by other commodifi ed bodies. Yet life constantly 
escapes, as Foucault put it, and consequently this faith and cynicism comes out 
of something more material than either science or history. It comes out of (self) 
possession—and unsurprisingly we can then expect the intensity of critique to be 
generated by the intensity of possession, which would return us to race, among 
other dispossessions, and the abolition of the possessed and possessive self in 
favour of what Marx called the social individual.
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Thus the most idealist moment in the practice of critique of these students, 
the moment of religion, or the resignation to fortune, contains within it a very 
materialist critique not of the failure of the rational, but of the failure of fate 
itself to achieve the very totality it threatens at the moment of possession. Fatality 
always overreaches itself. At this moment another affectability manages to escape, 
and this takes the form of a critique, a critique not of the contradiction between 
the production of fate and the rationality of management, or indeed European 
Enlightenment thought, but a grounded critique of fate itself as a totality. Some-
thing escapes, then, not from history or science and indeed much less through 
history or science, but by way of the body and of the bodies of others: which is 
to say by way of affect. This is a crucial passage precisely because it is the body 
that at least, at very least, capitalism can claim. In the moment when rationality 
recognizes the sneakers, the body still wears them and by wearing them is supposed 
to create the objectivity of capitalism that the mind would deny. But the fl esh 
does not hold. This sensation of another affectability, of some other grip on 
the fl esh, indicts fate as a false totality (and we might add history and science as 
false concretes in this universality). And in this way both faith and cynicism in the 
students counter-pose a more affected, a more material totality: one that refl ects 
at another level of the impossibility of fully separating labour from labour-power 
in the body or in society.
This critique, based on faith or fortune in its positive form, in its strategic 
form, is what the liberation theologians call the preferential option for the poor. 
Such a strategy is often misunderstood as a kind of sectarianism in the realm of 
the spirit. Or else it is misunderstood as a spiritual cover for secular struggle. It 
is neither of these. It is an attempt to build a kingdom on earth based on the 
separation of this affectability, on the preference for this affectability, one might 
even say based on an exodus of that affectability against the mere possession of 
fate and the meagre affect faith and fortune identify. Now, for liberation theo-
logians, clearly this affectability, to say nothing of this faith and fortune, are 
to be found among the poor, but this is not a simple sociological point. Their 
elaboration of both Jesus as ordinarily human and early Christian communities 
as communist can be read as an effort to imagine what this kind of affectability 
would look like (Ferm, 1986). This was an affectability that did not diagnose itself 
as in need of rationality, but in search of meekness, gentleness, humility, and 
some new kind of possession by others that sought not separation of labour from 
labour-power but new combinations of bodies in cooperation. Faith and fortune 
that led away from these concrete moments of another affectability, the faith 
and fortune of the land-owners for instance, both help to identify capitalist affect 
and its possession and dispossession of the poor and in the poor.8 The pre-
ferential option for the poor in this sense is proper both to post-structuralism 
and the post-colonialism that is the context of that theory (Young, 2000). It puts 
history and science under erasure, until such time as something we might call 
the affectable human might be produced from this preference, and after which 
whatever such new projects might look like, they would not start from the indi-
vidual self-determination that has chased the development of capitalism since 
Descartes (Federici, 2004).
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A Case in Point
One vehicle that can be used to highlight some of these issues is an exploration 
of the global water industry, with specifi c reference to the hydroelectric power in-
dustry, and with a useful initial focus on India. The Booker prize-winning novelist 
and political essayist, Arundhati Roy, has on the cover of her book Power Politics 
(Roy, 2001) a photograph of an Indian peasant woman demonstrating vividly 
affectability, as she stands in the middle of what appears to be a sea of fast running 
water up to her waist, a show of corporeal defi ance against the fl ooding of her 
village by the damming of a river for another hydroelectric power scheme. We 
begin with the image without explanation and ask what the issues involved might 
be. The scene does not immediately present itself as a managerial one—it appears 
to be a natural disaster, in an arid area only infrequently accustomed to heavy 
rain, and one that motivates sympathy, with possible managerial consequences of 
rescue, reparation, resettlement, recovery and risk management. We ask what 
options the peasants might have for responding to these situations. Fate and faith 
typically begin to emerge in discussion.
We then introduce the text of an advertisement placed close to the International 
Departure gates in London’s Heathrow Airport in July 2006 by the Chevron 
Corporation which read ‘In the next 20 years the world will grow by nearly one 
and a half billion people. So how do we satisfy their appetite for energy?’9
The increase in population mentioned will of course come largely in the 
developing world, where poverty is still a major issue, and the issue of energy 
consumption is likely to be greatest in India and China, although this process 
is not the natural consequence of the raising of a standard of living across the 
board, as Roy’s (1999, 2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b) work illuminates dramatically. 
As she puts it, in India and the developing world more generally, while on the 
one hand there are groups who are benefi ting from economic development, 
becoming wealthy in the process, other groups are being excluded as never 
before, forming a massive global underclass below the proletariat, who are unable 
even to sell their labour—Castells’s fourth world, those migrant labourers, sub-
sistence farmers, indigenous communities, and urban dwellers in the mega-slums 
thrown up by new enclosures—who are heading into the future on separate 
convoys. As Roy (2001: 3) expresses it ‘The tiny convoy is on its way to a glittering 
destination somewhere near the top of their world. The other convoy just melts 
into the darkness and disappears’.
With this in mind, we present the students with some evidence of the most 
glaring disparities and contradictions (most of them acknowledged by global 
energy corporations) such as the situation that 6 percent of the world’s popu-
lation own 50 percent of its wealth—and they are all American. At the same 
time, 70 percent of the world’s population are illiterate; 35 percent of the 
world’s population have inadequate food supplies; and 35 percent of the world’s 
population have problematic access to potable water. Our source is the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) but others could be used—fi gures 
would differ at the margins but would broadly concur. Our concern here is 
that the questions that need to be addressed are not framed by the 70 percent 
illiterates, nor the 35 percent struggling for a drink, but the extended networks of 
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the 6 percent. We invite students then to try to see the world and these problems 
from the perspective of the affectables—those dispossessed of self-determination.
At this point then, we can reconnect the Chevron question to our opening 
photograph, and reveal that the woman was in fact being fl ooded out of her home 
and livelihood—even a subsistence one—by what was and is part of an attempt to 
provide part of the answer to Chevron’s question. The way the question is posed is 
of course critical. For a capitalist corporation, a body of people is considered 
relevant, and thus emerges from abjection, in terms of its potential as a body of 
consumers. The fi rst question—the one silenced by the Chevron dialogue—is how 
to make them consumers, how to get them to buy more Coca-Cola or use more 
energy. Roy in several well-referenced and highly readable political essays discusses 
the ways that US and other international corporations, with the support of their 
governments, set about convincing the Indian national and regional governments 
of the importance of increasing energy consumption and accordingly energy 
generating capacity, despite the massive ineffi ciencies and corruptions of the 
existing system that if remedied would have more than coped with any neces-
sary expansion. The dynamics of these interactions extend politically from local 
village politicians to the White House; involve intricate fi nancial arrangements 
that are specially created by governments and the World Bank for their benefi t; 
may involve extremely one-sided contracts with crippling effects on the national 
debt of developing countries (Enron was disastrously engaged here); may involve 
controversial and questionable expert technical assessments often provided by 
supposedly independent experts whose independence is compromised; almost 
always displace thousands to hundreds of thousands of people living off the land 
(although not owning any of it—the abject affectables, of whom some 500,000 are 
estimated to have been displaced into nomadism) who receive no resettlement or 
compensation (even those who own the land may receive no compensation and 
resettlement is invariably inappropriate); may have disastrous anthropological and 
environmental consequences; and invariably benefi t a limited group of corporate 
bodies whether as operators, constructors or investors. There are ample resources 
available through government, non-government and activist bodies both on and via 
the web, with substantial conventional bibliographic resources in books and 
journals also available to explore these issues and possible responses. What we 
are most interested in, of course, is the reconstruction of the questions from the 
point of view of the affected and dispossessed.
We begin the pursuit of the question in the context of India working outwards 
from Roy’s work both theoretically and empirically. While there are other ample 
examples available across the world, especially in Africa and South America, our 
own currently preferred avenues for further student exploration are the James 
Bay and Rupert River projects in Canada and the huge projects on the Yangtse, 
the Three Gorges project and the secretive Tiger Leaping Gorge Project in 
China.10 There is scope for individual or group projects here, dissertations and 
even PhDs such is the range of material available, although obtaining primary 
empirical data becomes problematic. We want students to question the posing 
of questions, and think outside the Enlightenment-capitalist frame to which they 
have become accustomed, whilst reading this new perspective back into capitalism 
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on different grounds. Our view and experience is that once the problems are 
framed in identifi ably human terms, students can bring an often considerable 
range of personal as well as intellectual resources to bear on the issues and can 
come to recognize how and where such questions as belief and faith arise in 
the conditions of possession that remain available to the dispossessed. To put it 
another way,
How are you going to persuade a Naga Sadhu—whose life mission has been to stand on 
one leg for twenty years or to tow a car with his penis—that he can’t live without Coca-
Cola? (Roy, 2004a: 17)
A Naga Sadhu is a warrior-ascetic of a Shivite sect that goes naked (naga). 
There are an estimated 5 million of them in India today. Their faith enables 
them to set improbable objectives and achieve them in the process of overcoming 
materiality and carnal desire, which is a form of taking possession that capitalism 
fi nds it impossible to incorporate. At the time of writing, there is no evidence 
that the sect has ever drunk Coca-Cola, but both the objectives mentioned by 
Roy have been achieved. The car-towing took place at the Maha Kumbh Mela 
in 2001 (an event that happens every 114 years) where the car was the District 
Commissioner’s and the passengers were the DC, his wife and his children and 
there was considerable if surprising media coverage. The sect even has a web 
presence across several sites. But the confrontation between the Sadhu and the 
Coca-Cola Corporation is more than simply metaphorical. The Kumbh Melas are 
festivals that take place on rotating sites every three years, and draw millions of 
sadhus to bathe in sacred river waters. The waters of the rivers are not (in this 
case at least) being diverted to produce Coke.11 But as Rampuri, an American 
who became a sadhu in the 1960s, has observed
the melas used to be sacred events but the last few have witnessed billboards for soft drinks 
and seen luxury tents erected for curious onlookers including newly affl uent Indians.
‘The perception of India has changed in the last few years—many Indians don’t under-
stand what’s happened’, Rampuri says. ‘But they embrace Coke and Pepsi. The idiot 
box has replaced word of mouth. It’s a pivotal moment. People have money now. It was 
never really needed before—a little income was enough. I see myself now as a witness 
to this.’ (AFP, 2005)
The Sadhu may take emphatic possession of their symbolic world, and convert it 
into dramatic material demonstrations, but they depend on the charity of others 
to be able to live, to wander and be fed in return for stories, traditional medicine, 
yogic instruction and spiritual guidance. Whilst the Coca-Cola Corporation might 
not be able to sell them its commodity, it can commodify them, participate in 
turning their rituals into spectacle, and though not selling ringside seats, can use 
the spectacle as an advertising opportunity, a chance to sell refreshments and 
steal their magic. It repartitions the world around them, and though leaving their 
faith untouched, may ultimately squeeze out their possibility of existence.
On a more everyday note, Roy describes how the untouchable dispossessed 
peasantry, rendered abject and without identity or recognized existence in the 
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politics of power that authorized the dam development discussed earlier, became 
organized (e.g. through the Narmada Bachao Andolan, whose website documents 
the continuing daily struggle). Here the dispossessed demonstrated that they 
had remarkable intelligence, talent and skills that they were able to motivate 
in protesting the situation. The continuing story of the resistance, its successes 
and its repression, unfolds in the press and on the web and the story has no 
conclusion—the questions are live ones in India, Canada, China, South America 
and Africa in particular. But what it does demonstrate is what Rancière (2004, 
2006) calls ‘subjectifi cation’ in a move to emphasize the positive aspects of 
processes that when encountered in the work of Foucault are widely interpreted 
as constraining. For Rancière, subjectifi cation can take place not only in being 
‘written’ as a subject by rule, custom and law, but by asserting oneself creatively 
in the world and carving out new spaces for being, effectively writing subjectivity 
anew. For Rancière (2006), politics is inseparable from aesthetics, indeed it is an 
aesthetic activity, as it involves carving up the world in terms of sensibilities—the 
‘partition of sensibility’—that tells us how and what we are able to feel and 
express. The abject of course, can only be affected, which is where Rancière 
supports da Silva, but can emerge from abjection by creative acts of political 
aesthetics that rewrite possibility by asserting new grounds of social possession of 
sensibility that may themselves realize the ‘preferential option’—which makes the 
photograph of the peasant woman wading in fl oodwater with which we began our 
discussion precisely such an act of political aesthetics.
Conclusion
But where does all this leave us, and how far from the original question with 
which we began? If we sense that faith and fortune in the students are indeed 
forms of critique then as scholars and teachers our fi rst obligation is of course to 
make room for this critique. We have tried to show in our example some materials 
that can call out that critique, and broaden students’ recognition of their own 
critical potential as they work through open questions. But if that critique is to 
come fully into focus, we also have to develop a preferential option. For liberation 
theologians, the task was to reclaim Christianity from its own transcendental 
moment, the moment that denies the meek the earth they are biblically supposed 
to inherit by denying them both their meekness and their earth and giving to 
them, in perfect harmony with the history of transcendental humanism, only the 
power of heaven. This is the task for us too. We can recognize the critique of 
capitalism contained in the Naga Sadhu’s practices, but despite its success as a 
form of possession we cannot demand of the affected that they continue to drag 
around a metaphorical weight attached to their genitals only to be alleviated 
in ultimate transcendence. Recognizing in students this critique based on faith 
and fortune can be a fi rst step toward transcending this critique in favour of 
the critique of the Enlightenment. We need to build a base with them in the 
classroom that transforms our existing critiques until such time as we ourselves 
may inherit their affectability, a base that would strive for what we might call self-
determination by affective possession.
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Notes
 1. ‘What Is the Empirical’ Friday 8 June 2007, Goldsmiths College, University of London.
 2. For a fuller discussion of the semantic and practical connections between ‘chance’, 
‘fortune’ and ‘fate’ than we are able to give here see Thiry-Cherques (2005).
 3. See for example Ferraro et al. (2005) whose critique of economistic explanations 
of human behaviour calls for more, but better and different (i.e. psychologistic) 
empirical science.
 4. The work on feminists in the movement out of which Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri write is crucial here, especially the collection by Mariarossa Della Costa and 
Selma James on the refusal of housework, and Leopaldina Fortunati (1995) on the 
hidden forms of capitalist value in the home, in love, and in prostitution.
 5. Paolo Virno attributes this cynicism to a kind of breakdown of the general equivalent 
in capitalism which used, however harshly, to offer a form of measurement and 
comparison. This breakdown is caused by the diffi culty of measuring what manage-
ment sciences would call knowledge work or emotional labour. We prefer this 
materialist cynicism to a more moralistic one.
 6. This is also a strategy that remains more explicitly within the tradition of the cri-
tique of the Enlightenment, and it is for this reason that it takes Gayatri Spivak and 
her notion of the abuse of the Enlightenment as its starting point. Spivak says that 
the fi rst right is the right to refuse rights—a position that does not so much reject 
enlightenment values as reject their inadequacy.
 7. There have been some good efforts to try to meet the objective idealism of capital-
ism with the objective idealism of ethics. Noteworthy is Rene ten Bos, Martin Parker, 
and Campbell Jones, (2005) For Business Ethics.
 8. Here too we have another way to understand the concept of the base community, as 
the organization of this affectability, and why in some sense such bases are designed 
contrary to our notion of the base as a source of strength, power, stability. Base 
communities are often weak when understood in both capitalist, and it must be said 
Marxist, wars of manoeuvre. But their threat, and the threat of their affectability 
spreading, if we are to judge by the responses of the Church or the State, is not 
small. In this sense they have nothing in common with the concentrated fi repower 
of an al-Qaeda cell or the Davidian compound, although something perhaps in com-
mon with Move. See Peter Hallward (2002) on the idea of the base in liberation 
theology for more.
 9. The ad was one of a series of outdoor ads, the complete set of which can be seen 
at http://www.willyoujoinus.com/advertising/outdoor/. The ‘willyoujoinus’ site is 
an ostensible attempt by the Chevron corporation to involve consumers in forward 
looking energy debates.
10. Some useful sources would include Brown (2005); McCully (2001, 2003); Qing 
(1998); Sydney Morning Herald (2005); Bretton Woods Project (2005); World Com-
mission on Dams (2000), and websites of campaigners and NGOs such as Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (see Friends of River Narmada, n.d.);  Probe International (n.d.); 
and the International Rivers Network (1985–2008).
11. Coca-Cola has a history of diverting millions of litres of groundwater per day for use 
in its bottling plants, with the collusion of local offi cials as argued by Medha Patkar, 
leader of the National Alliance of People’s Movement (NAPM), who says ‘the Coke-
Administration nexus . . . operates against the interest of people, polarizes money 
and power making the poor poorer and far more exploited’. The water table then 
sinks too low for handpumps to work and farmers must either invest in expensive 
deep-pumping equipment or give up their lands, perhaps to work in the bottling 
plant (Nath, 2003).
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